Ontario – Arbitrator removed mid-hearing for cross-examining witnesses, despite parties’ agreement to inquisitorial approach – #965

In Atkinsréalis Construction (Pacific) Inc. v. GIP Construction Ontario East Ltd., 2026 ONSC 5666(“Atkinsréalis”), the Court removed a sole arbitrator part-way through an arbitration pursuant to s. 13(6) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, SO 1991, c 17 (the “Act”). The Court held that the arbitrator, by conducting prepared, cross-examinations of the applicant’s witnesses, had “descended into the arena” and created circumstances that may give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Court reached this conclusion even though both parties had agreed that the arbitrator could adopt a “somewhat more inquisitorial approach” and could “question any witness.” In doing so, the Court emphasized that the duties of equal and fair treatment in s. 19 of the Act are mandatory, and that parties cannot contract out of the requirement that an arbitrator be, and be seen to be, neutral.

Background Facts – Atkinsréalis Construction (Pacific) Inc. (“ATRL”) was the prime contractor on the Trillium Line Extension Stage 2 Project in Ottawa. It retained GIP Construction Ontario East Ltd. (“GIP”) as its roadworks subcontractor. Each party made claims against the other arising from project delays that led to changes in the agreed scope and timing of the work, and they agreed to arbitrate those claims in a single proceeding before a jointly appointed arbitrator (the “Arbitrator”).

The Arbitrator was an experienced construction arbitrator, and the parties chose him for that expertise. At a pre-hearing conference, he advised counsel of his “preference for a somewhat more inquisitorial approach,” and both counsel concurred. His terms of appointment provided, in material part, that;

“Recognizing that the Arbitrator is a neutral adjudicator of the dispute between the Parties, the Arbitrator shall be entitled to question any witness. including Party-appointed experts, provided that the Parties shall be provided the opportunity to ask additional questions on any matters addressed or raised by the Arbitrator’s questioning.”

At the opening of the hearing, the Arbitrator reiterated his practice of being “a little more inquisitorial than your typical judge.” Both counsel agreed to this, with ATRL’s counsel responding that he had “no issue” with that approach.

Evidence-in-chief was delivered through witness statements and expert reports before the hearing. On the eighth hearing day, after all fact witnesses had been examined and with three days of expert evidence remaining, ATRL brought a motion within the arbitration seeking to remove the Arbitrator under s. 13 of the Act. The Arbitrator dismissed the challenge. ATRL then applied to the Court under s. 13(6), alleging that “circumstances exist that give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias”.

Legislative Framework – The Court focussed its analysis on the fairness provisions of the Act. Section 19(1) provides that “[i]n an arbitration, the parties shall be treated equally and fairly,” which the Court described as “a mandatory requirement.” To “drive home” that mandatory character, s. 3 permits the parties to vary or exclude any provision of the Act subject to six listed exceptions, one of which is s. 19. In the Court’s view, an arbitrator under the Act must therefore be “a neutral, independent decision-maker”, who “cannot lawfully be biased or predisposed towards a party.” If the parties do not agree to remove the arbitrator and the arbitrator does not resign, the arbitrator “shall decide the issue” (s. 13(5)). Within ten days of that decision, the challenging party may apply to the court, pursuant to s. 13(6) of the Act, “to decide the issue and, in the case of the challenging party, to remove the arbitrator.” The court’s decision on such an application is final, as s. 15(6) of the Actprovides that “there is no appeal from the court’s decision or from its directions.”

The Court’s Analysis – The Court noted that the application was not an appeal from the Arbitrator’s decision. Rather, the Court was directed to “decide the issue,” and the parties argued it de novo. The Court also made clear that no one questioned the Arbitrator’s good faith, and that ATRL did not allege actual bias. The issue was whether the Arbitrator’s conduct created “circumstances that may give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias”.

The Court rejected the Arbitrator’s view, and that of the commentators on whom he relied, that parties may agree to arbitrate by any process they wish, “including a civil inquisitional process or even a flip of a coin.” Because s. 3 of the Act provides that parties may not contract out of s. 19, “[a]t all times an arbitration must provide equal treatment and fair process.” The Court accepted that parties might devise a fair inquisitorial process but held that doing so “would likely require very express wording that carefully respects the mandatory language of the statute.”

The Court then turned to the case law on neutrality as a component of procedural fairness. Drawing on trial judge intervention cases, the Court held that a decision-maker may ask questions to clarify evidence but must not usurp counsel’s role. In Chippewas of Mnjikaning First Nation v. Chiefs of Ontario, 2010 ONCA 47, the Court of Appeal cautioned that when trial judges question witnesses, they must “use care and not create an impression through the questioning process of having adopted a position on the facts, issues or credibility.” Similarly, in McFarlane v. Safadi, 2004 CanLII 12644 (ON CA), the Court of Appeal held at para. 34 that “if a trial judge questions a witness in a manner that gives the impression that he or she is adopting a particular position in opposition to one of the parties, he or she has gone too far.”

Turning to arbitrations, the Court stressed that despite “the wishes for autonomy expressed by some arbitrators in industry publications, the Arbitration Act, 1991 is the law of the land.” Relying on Szilard v. Szasz, 1954 CanLII 4 (SCC)(“Szilard”), and Vento Motorcycles, Inc. v. Mexico, 2025 ONCA 82(“Vento”), it held that the same principles govern a reasonable apprehension of bias whether the decision maker is a judge or an arbitrator. As the Court of Appeal explained in Vento, the reasonable apprehension of bias test “applies to a wide range of decisionmakers in public and private law, including both statutory and private consensual adjudicators.” It also noted the Court of Appeal’s recent decision in R. v. M.M., 2026 ONCA 617, which held that a trial judge “may never become the cross-examiner.”

On the Arbitrator’s questioning in this case, the Court first noted that the Arbitrator relied on Dufferin v. Morrison Hershfield, 2022 ONSC 3485, in which a challenge to the same Arbitrator’s questioning had failed. The Court agreed that the transcripts showed a highly prepared arbitrator but found that the concern here was with his “carefully prepared and executed cross-examinations” of ATRL’s witnesses. The Arbitrator had reasoned that questioning by a judge or arbitrator “is not, by definition, cross-examination,” because a neutral adjudicator has no opponent and no adversarial intent. The Court held that this “misses the point” as arbitrators “must not cross-examine precisely because questioning in that way and for those purposes is the role of adversarial counsel and is not consistent with the required neutrality of an arbitrator or judge.” (Emphasis in original.) Cross-examination, the Court explained, “is not a simple search for the truth,” but a technique designed to elicit evidence desired by the examiner.

The Court reviewed two extended passages from the arbitration hearing transcript. It described the proceedings as follows. In questioning one of ATRL’s witnesses, the Arbitrator first used general, leading questions to pin the witness down to enumerated options in a construction contract for dealing with proposed changes that did not include termination, then returned later to confront the witness with a prior inconsistent statement, brushed aside his explanations and led him to the admission sought at the outset. The Court described the Arbitrator’s questioning as “a skillful piece of cross-examination in which the Arbitrator sought to undermine a key plank in ATRL’s case.” With another of ATRL’s witnesses, the Arbitrator questioned whether the witness had written his own statement without the assistance of counsel. Although the Arbitrator said he was critical of both sides’ witness statements, only this witness was cross-examined on this point.

The Court then addressed the Arbitrator’s “contextual points.” It accepted that the Arbitrator’s expertise and advance receipt of the written evidence allowed him to come into the hearing “hot.” But neither the parties’ agreement to a “somewhat more inquisitorial approach,” nor the terms of appointment, which authorized the Arbitrator to question witnesses, meant that the parties had contracted out of a fair hearing. As the Court put it, nothing in the terms of appointment “authorizes the Arbitrator to cross-examine or to shed his cloak of neutrality.”

Lastly, the Court considered the effect of any failure by ATRL to object to the alleged misconduct in a timely manner. The Court found the Arbitrator’s findings contradictory, as he had concluded that ATRL’s failure to object was “fatal” to the challenge, and later that it was “not fatal” but “strong evidence” that the questioning was not perceived as unfair. Regardless, because parties cannot consent to unfair proceedings, a failure to object is not a waiver of unfair conduct but is relevant to whether the challenge is brought later for tactical reasons. The Arbitrator had himself found no evidence of tactical motive, and the Court found that ATRL’s counsel had in fact objected “in a measured and respectful way.”

The Court concluded that a reasonably informed observer would apprehend that the Arbitrator “may have predetermined the outcome and, as such, may not decide the arbitration fairly,” and ordered his removal under ss. 13(1) and 15(1) of the Act.

Commentary:

Mid-hearing removal of an arbitrator is rare, and the decision is striking because the parties had both chosen the Arbitrator and accepted that he had a more inquisitorial style. Critically, autonomy, however broad, does not displace procedural fairness or natural justice. As the Court of Appeal cautioned in Vento, a reasonable apprehension of bias “cannot be balanced away.”

The case also echoes the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision in Hunt v. The Owners, Strata Plan LMS 2556, 2018 BCCA 159 (“Hunt”), and together the two cases should dispel any misconception that arbitration’s procedural flexibility comes with looser standards of fairness. In Hunt, the Court set aside an award after discovering that counsel for one party had four undisclosed, private communications with the arbitrators. Like the present case, the Court relied on Szilard, holding that “[a]rbitration is a form of judicial proceeding” and that arbitrators “must be impartial, independent decision-makers.” It also rejected the argument that the arbitration’s result was inevitable, holding that actual prejudice is irrelevant once a reasonable apprehension of bias is established.

The decision, however, should not discourage arbitrators from sharing their preliminary views during a hearing. In S.N. Carlson Trucking Ltd. v. 590580 B.C. Ltd., 2018 BCCA 211, the British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected a bias challenge to a trial judge who had questioned counsel and occasionally witnesses and expressed difficulty accepting the appellants’ theory. The Court held that, “[i]t is not unfair for a judge to express some preliminary views of the case,” because doing so, “allows the parties to direct their advocacy to the points troubling the judge, and to correct errors that might be seen in the judge’s preliminary reactions.” Indeed, “counsel should welcome indications from a judge that the judge is having difficulty understanding that party’s theory, so that counsel can address it.”

The Arbitrator in Atkinsréalis offered a similar rationale for his approach, and ATRL’s counsel agreed it made counsel’s “lives easier to know what you are interested in.” The difference, however, lies in the approach of the respective decision makers. While flagging a concern to counsel, based on the record, and inviting a response keeps the decision maker’s mind visibly open, descending into the arena by adducing admissions through leading questions to a witness gives at least the appearance of the opposite. Arbitrators who want to telegraph the issues troubling them would therefore do well to raise them with counsel directly, rather than to through pressing witnesses with leading questions.

As a further practical takeaway, arbitrators who favour an active style should keep their questions open-ended and avoid leading or confrontational questioning. Likewise, parties who want a genuinely inquisitorial process should say so expressly in the procedural order, defining what the tribunal may and may not do. In this regard, international practice is generally more indulgent of tribunal questioning. Article 8.3(g) of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration(the “IBA Rules”), for example, provides that the tribunal may ask questions of a witness at any time. Parties who adopt the IBA Rules may therefore expect a more active tribunal, although the arbitrator’s overriding duty of neutrality remains unchanged. And counsel who are concerned about a tribunal’s questioning should raise that concern promptly, and in a measured way, as ATRL’s counsel did here.