notes on new arbitration cases in Canada
In 2024, parties raised various novel and creative grounds (and also some more traditional grounds) to seek annulment or resist the homologation of arbitral awards in Québec.
Continue reading “Philippe’s 2024 Hot Topic – Québec courts rejected creative challenges to arbitral awards – #887”
In 2024, for the first time, two appeal courts considered the “brick wall” exception to competence-competence set out in Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, 2020 SCC 16 (“Uber”).
Continue reading “Julie’s 2024 Hot Topic – Exceptions to Competence-Competence Litigated in Appellate Courts in 2024 – #883”
In Pomerleau Inc. v 4HD Construction Ltd., 2024 BCSC 1973, the Court addressed two petitions. The first, by 4HD (the claimant/respondent by counterclaim in the arbitration), sought a ruling that the arbitrator had not, in fact, been appointed and declaring the award to be void or, alternatively, an order that the arbitrator be removed as arbitrator and the award set aside on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias. The second, by Pomerleau (the respondent/counterclaimant in the arbitration), sought recognition and enforcement of the award. The Court dismissed the first petition and granted the second. The arbitrator ruled that he had been appointed based on an email sent to him by 4HD advising him that he had been jointly selected as arbitrator and the had parties participated in the arbitration, even though no arbitration agreement was ever signed. The arbitrator issued an award dismissing the claims based on the claimant’s failure to prosecute the arbitration. The Court found that the arbitrator was correct that he had been properly appointed. The fact that the arbitrator was owed outstanding fees (only a few thousand dollars) by the claimant at the time he ruled on his appointment was insufficient to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias to justify setting aside the award.
Continue reading “B.C. – Arbitrator Properly Appointed Despite No Signed Agreement – #881”
In 9327-6269 Québec inc. and Banque de Montréal, 2024 QCCS 3399, the Court dismissed the Creditor Applicants’ demand to lift the stay of proceedings under the Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (LACC)/ Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) so that they could file proceedings against one of the Debtors (Laboratoires C.O.P. inc.) in a New York-seated arbitration, where they sought to be declared owners of potential tax credits and refunds to which they alleged they were entitled as part of the selling price under a Sale Purchase Agreement between the Applicants and the Debtors’ shareholders. The Sale Purchase Agreement contained an arbitration clause. The Applicants argued that under New York law the Sale Purchase Agreement created a constructive trust in their favour, as a result of which the tax credits and refunds received or to be received by the Debtor were never included in the Debtor’s assets. Therefore, the Applicants argued that they should not be subject to the CCAA. The Court dismissed the Applicants’ motion. Even if the Applicants obtained a favourable ruling from the arbitration tribunal, it would be ineffective because the constructive trust concept is not recognized under Québec law and it would be detrimental to other creditors of the Debtor. In any event, the arbitral award would not modify the distribution order of the Debtors’ assets to their creditors under the CCAA because, when a conflict of law arises, the CCAA’s application is governed by the lex fori, in this case Québec. Foreign law should not alter the outcome of the CCAA’s implementation due to its rehabilitative purpose. Therefore, lifting the stay would not help the Applicants and would only cause the CCAA procedure to be delayed.
Continue reading “Québec – Peace River not considered where referral to arbitration sought under LACC/CCAA – #877”
In Clayton v. Canada (Attorney General), 2024 ONCA 581, the Court dismissed an appeal from an order dismissing an application to set aside an arbitral award made under Chapter 11 of NAFTA (“the Award”). The appellants sought to set aside the award on the grounds that the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction and that the award violated public policy. The Court rejected both arguments. In the underlying arbitration, which was bifurcated into liability and damages hearings, the tribunal found that the respondent had breached the relevant NAFTA provisions, but that the appellants did not establish that the breach caused the damages sought. The appellants applied to the Ontario Superior Court to set aside the Award, arguing that the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by not properly applying the law, and that the Award violated public policy because it was “so unreasonable as to be unenforceable”. The Superior Court dismissed the application. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Challenges to arbitral awards on jurisdictional grounds are restricted to “true jurisdictional questions”, and there is a very high burden to set aside an award for public policy reasons.
Continue reading “Ontario – Alleged error in applying the law not a jurisdiction issue – #865”
In The Joseph Lebovic Charitable Foundation, The Dr. Wolf Lebovic Charitable Foundation, the Estate of Joseph Lebovic and Wolf Lebovic v Jewish Foundation of Greater Toronto and Joseph and Wolf Lebovic Jewish Community Campus, 2024 ONSC 4400, the Court upheld the arbitrator’s order that he had jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute that arose after a Consent Order made in an earlier arbitration. The parties’ first dispute fell within the scope of the arbitration clause in their agreement. They settled that dispute and the arbitrator issued a Consent Order that contained a term that referred, “any disputes regarding the matters referred to in this Order” back to him for resolution. A second arbitration did not proceed. The same arbitrator was appointed to decide the issues in dispute in a third arbitration. The respondents in the arbitration (“Lebovic”) argued that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction because the issues raised were grounded in the Consent Order and not in the agreement that contained the arbitration clause. The arbitrator decided that he had jurisdiction, in part, because: (1) resolving this third dispute would necessarily involve factual consideration of the contract terms, and obligations and conduct of the parties under both the parties’ agreement and the Consent Order; and (2) the issues raised by Lebovic were all grounded in rights and obligations which were initiated by the terms of their agreement. Lebovic maintained their objection and applied to the Court under section 17(8) of the Ontario Arbitration Act, 1991, SO 1991, c. 17, “to decide the matter”. The focus of this case note is the arbitrator’s decision, because the application was decided on the basis of waiver.
Continue reading “Ontario – Arbitrator jurisdiction – dispute arose from Consent Order after earlier arbitration – #863”
In Roxboro Excavation Inc. v. Delsan-AIM Environmental Services Inc., 2024 QCCS 2331 the Court declined to hear a dispute between the Applicant, Roxboro Excavation Inc. (“Roxboro”), and the Defendant, Les Services environnementales Delsan-A.I.M. Inc. (“Delsan”), on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction because the parties had agreed to submit the matter to arbitration. Even though the subject contract included an arbitration clause, the Court did not interpret the clause or otherwise consider whether that clause required the parties to arbitrate the disputes. The Court instead focussed its analysis and decision on a separate agreement the parties had negotiated to resolve their disputes by arbitration and not in court.
Continue reading “Québec – Court finds separate arbitration agreement, despite arbitration clause in contract – #857”
In GlobeAir Holding GmbH c. Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp., 2024 QCCS 2451, the Court referred a claim to arbitration and, despite confirming its jurisdiction to do so, refused to issue interim measures. The Plaintiffs had argued that the claim, based in statute rather than contractual obligations, fell outside the scope of the arbitration clause, but the Court drew on the broad language of the clause to find otherwise. Then, after confirming that the Court had jurisdiction to issue interim measures even though the dispute was referred to arbitration seated in Ontario, it concluded that no prima facie case could be made to grant Plaintiffs’ request.
Continue reading “Québec – Any competent court can issue interim measures regardless of arbitral seat – #854”
In Medjuck v Medjuck, 2024 ONSC 2980,the Court dismissed an application for a de novo hearing to decide the matter of disclosure requests that were denied in part by the Arbitrator on several grounds, including that he did not have jurisdiction to grant some of the requests. The Court held that it did not have authority to intervene in the arbitration so as to hear and rule on the disclosure request de novo. It found that the request did not fall under any of grounds listed at section 6 (court intervention limited) of the Ontario Arbitration Act, 1991, SO 1991, c 17.
Continue reading “Ontario – Court won’t intervene in arbitration to order disclosure against a party – #851”
In Attorney General of Canada v. Aéroports de Montréal, 2023 FC 1562, the Court decided the issue of a tribunal’s jurisdiction under section 16(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which is incorporated into the Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 17 as the “Commercial Arbitration Code” (the “CAC”). The tribunal had made a preliminary ruling that it had jurisdiction over the commercial dispute between the parties. The Court upheld the tribunal’s finding. The issue involved a determination of whether the arbitration clause in one of three related contracts applied. This case reiterates the following key arbitration principles: the power of an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction does not limit the powers of the Court to weigh and make its own findings of fact, on the basis of the evidence, and to consider and rule de novo on that jurisdiction; the Court must take the pleaded facts by a plaintiff as true on a jurisdiction motion; and if both interpretations of an arbitration agreement proposed by the parties are possible, priority must be given to the interpretation that favours the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.
Continue reading “Federal – Competence- competence: a rule of chronological priority – #849”