In Bollhorn v Lakehouse Custom Homes Ltd., 2024 BCCA 192, the Court dismissed an application by the Appellant/Plaintiff Robert Bollhorn for leave to appeal an award of an arbitrator. This outcome resulted from the Court’s application of Rule 27 of the Vancouver International Arbitration Centre (“VanIAC”) Domestic Arbitration Rules (the “Rules”) and Section 59(3) of the Arbitration Act, SBC 2020, c 2. The former operates to foreclose appeals where the award is issued under the Expedited Procedures of the Rules, which the Court found applied to the case. The latter provides that there can be no appeal on a question of law where the arbitration agreement – in this case the parties’ adoption of the Rules – expressly disallows it.
Continue reading “B.C. – Court strictly enforces arbitration rules to foreclose leave to appeal award – #843”Nunavut – No lawyer disqualification for near-client relationship in prior arbitration – #841
In The Government of Nunavut v. Stantec Architecture Ltd., 2024 NUCJ 11, the Court dismissed the application of Defendant Stantec Architecture Ltd. (“Stantec”) to disqualify the lawyers of the Plaintiff, Government of Nunavut (“Nunavut”), from acting in the litigation. The dispute arose from the construction of an arena (“Project”). Stantec, the architect for the Project, argued that the Nunavut’s lawyers were in a conflict of interest because of a confidential cooperation agreement in which Nunavut’s counsel had assisted Stantec in a previous arbitration in which Stantec and the construction company hired for the Project were parties. That construction company was not a party to this action. Stantec alleged a “near-client” relationship with Nunavut’s lawyers arising from this cooperation agreement which disqualified them from acting for Nunavut in this litigation. The Court dismissed the application because the cooperation agreement specifically excluded the creation of a solicitor-client relationship between Stantec and Nunavut’s lawyers and expressly reserved the parties’ rights and recourses against each other concerning the Project.
Continue reading “Nunavut – No lawyer disqualification for near-client relationship in prior arbitration – #841”Ontario – Court dismisses action for issue estoppel based on prior arbitration – #840
In Ford v. GMP Securities LP, 2024 ONSC 271, the Court partially dismissed an action for issue estoppel, relying on a 2022 arbitral award that had been rendered as a result of a dispute between a group of shareholders (of which the plaintiff was a part) and an entity that the defendants (investment dealer and senior investment banker) had represented in a reverse take-over process. The defendants were found to be privies of the parties to the previous arbitration, even though they were not parties themselves. The only claims remaining in the Ontario action were the ones that had not been raised or decided in the previous arbitration.
Continue reading “Ontario – Court dismisses action for issue estoppel based on prior arbitration – #840”B.C. – BCCA goes deep and wide on partial stays – #838
Davidson v. Lyra Growth Partners Inc., 2024 BCCA 133 concerns whether there is jurisdiction under s. 7 of the Arbitration Act, S.B.C. 2020, c. 2 (“Arbitration Act”) to grant a partial stay of court proceedings concerning only those matters arguably agreed to be arbitrated by the parties or whether a court is required to stay the entire action. The Court confirmed that partial stays are available under the Arbitration Act where the court action raises some non-arbitrable matters despite there being no express language permitting non-arbitrable matters to proceed in Court – unlike other provincial legislation. It set out factors that should be considered by a court of first instance in determining whether to grant a partial stay or a complete stay. It also emphasized, however, that a stay of those matters arguably agreed to be arbitrated is mandatory if the requirements of s. 7 are met. In this case it had been argued that a stay could be refused as the “essential nature” or “pith and substance” of the court proceedings related to matters not covered by the arbitration agreement. The Court confirmed that there is no “residual” jurisdiction to deny a stay on that basis. This decision aligns with the Supreme Court of Canada’s guidance in TELUS Communications Inc. v Wellman, 2019 SCC 19 (“Wellman”) concerning the mandatory nature of stays of court proceedings that relate to any matter arguably reserved for arbitration.
Continue reading “B.C. – BCCA goes deep and wide on partial stays – #838”Ontario – Parties share responsibility to keep arbitration moving – #835
In Bank-Strox Renovation Inc. v. Lugano View Limited, (“Bank-Strox”) the Court dismissed the defendant’s motion to dismiss a construction lien action for delay where the had parties agreed to have their dispute resolved by arbitration. As a reminder of the sharp distinction between litigation and arbitration, the Court held that a respondent in an arbitration has the same, or in some circumstances a greater, contractual obligation to keep the arbitration moving as the claimant. Simply sitting back and doing nothing is not a basis to later seek dismissal of the claim for delay. That might work in a court case but it won’t where the parties have agreed to move their dispute to arbitration.
Continue reading “Ontario – Parties share responsibility to keep arbitration moving – #835”Ontario – Award unreasonable where tribunal failed to follow binding law on frustration – #832
In Taseko Mines Limited v. Franco-Nevada Corporation, 2023 ONSC 2055, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) granted an appeal from an arbitral award due to, among other things, the arbitrator’s failure to apply binding precedent on frustration of contract. Although the Court applied a deferential reasonableness standard, it concluded the arbitrator’s departure from binding jurisprudence rendered the award unreasonable.
Continue reading “Ontario – Award unreasonable where tribunal failed to follow binding law on frustration – #832”Ontario –“Fraud” does not include “constructive fraud” for set-aside application deadline – #829
Campbell v Toronto Standard Condominium Corporation No. 2600, 2024 ONCA 218, considered the meaning of “fraud” under section 46(1)9 of the Ontario Arbitration Act, 1991, SO 1991, c, 17. It provides that a court may set aside an award on the ground that, “the award was obtained by fraud.” The first issue before the Court was whether “fraud” includes “constructive fraud.” The main issue, however, was the interpretation to be given to sections 47(1) and (2), which provide that an application to set aside an award shall be commenced within 30 days after the applicant has received the award – except if the applicant alleges corruption or “fraud”. The Court found that “fraud” does not include “constructive fraud, which means that the Respondents were out of time to bring their set-aside application. It found that a broadening of the definition of fraud is not consistent with the statutory objectives to narrow the grounds for court interference in arbitrations. The Court expressed the view that the allegation of constructive fraud was made for the purpose of circumventing the statutory time limit for bringing a set-aside application. (This case is also useful for its summary of basic arbitration law principles. If you need a quick update or refresher of these, see my Editor’s Notes below for a “cheat sheet”.)
Continue reading “Ontario –“Fraud” does not include “constructive fraud” for set-aside application deadline – #829”B.C. – Leave to appeal interim award premature until arbitration concludes – #825
Brown v Smithwick, 2024 BCCA 83 is about an application for leave to appeal an interim award brought pursuant to section 59 of the British Columbia Arbitration Act, SBC 2020 c 2 (“Arbitration Act”). The Applicant sought leave to appeal on the ground that the arbitrator had erred in law by concluding that a debt that the Applicant owed to the Respondent was a debt within section 178(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B03 (the “BIA”), as a debt that arises out of fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity. The reasons of the Court focused on the issue of whether the leave application was premature because the arbitration had not yet ended. The Court held that while it has the discretion to grant leave to appeal from an interim arbitral award, the circumstances of the case weighed against exercising that discretion, including: (1) early judicial intervention would interfere with the arbitration process that the parties had agreed to; (2) the Applicant had not demonstrated that it would be prejudiced by the adjournment; and (3) there could be multiple leave applications to the Court arising from the same arbitration. The Court adjourned the leave application pending the conclusion of the arbitration.
Continue reading “B.C. – Leave to appeal interim award premature until arbitration concludes – #825”New Brunswick – Party autonomy includes ability to contract out of award – #821
The decision in Purrestore Management Services Inc., Gordon Gamble and Jason Reis v. Doiron, 2023 NBCA 110 concerns whether an arbitration clause in a franchise agreement that allowed a party to seek a de novo court trial if an arbitration award exceeded $100,000, conflicted with the mandatory provisions of the New Brunswick Arbitration Act, LRN-B 2014, c 100 (“Arbitration Act”). The franchisor had obtained an arbitration award against the franchisees for over $100,000 (“Arbitral Award”). The franchisees then sought a de novo trial, while the franchisor applied for judgment to enforce the Arbitral Award under s. 50 of the Act. The application judge affirmed the franchisees’ right to a de novo trial and dismissed the application for judgment. The franchisor appealed, arguing that the Arbitration Act provided that s.50 could not be contracted out of and, therefore, in the absence of an appeal or an application to set aside the Arbitral Award the franchisor was entitled to judgment. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, concluding that the arbitration clause was not contrary to the Act as the Act permitted parties to contract out of s. 37, which provides that “an award binds the parties, unless it is set aside or varied under section 45 (appeal) or 46 (set aside)”. To obtain a judgment to enforce an award under s. 50, a binding award under s. 37 was required but the parties had contracted out of 37 with their agreement.
Continue reading “New Brunswick – Party autonomy includes ability to contract out of award – #821”Ontario – Arbitrator’s stand-alone jurisdiction decision a preliminary “ruling” open to de novo review – #820
In Clost v Rennie, 2023 ONSC 6998, the Court ruled that an arbitration agreement was invalid after a de novo hearing to “decide the matter” of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction under section 17(8) of the Ontario Arbitration Act, 1991, SO 1991, c. 17 (the “Act”). The Applicant (also referred to in the decision and herein as “Norm”) contended that the arbitration agreement was invalid because it was contained in a lease agreement which he alleged was fraudulent because his signature was forged. The parties first submitted the jurisdictional issue to a sole arbitrator, who found the arbitration agreement to be valid. The Court accepted that a de novo hearing under s. 17(8) of the Act was required, finding that the Arbitrator had rendered a “ruling” on a preliminary question of jurisdiction rather than an “award”, even though the sole question he was asked to determine was jurisdiction. There was an extensive evidentiary record before the arbitrator relative to the jurisdictional issue. This raised for debate the difference between an “award” and a “ruling” on a preliminary question which can be decided by the Court on a hearing de novo. The Court completed its own review of the extensive evidentiary record and ultimately concluded that the lease (and therefore the arbitration agreement) was fraudulent and invalid and the arbitrator had no jurisdiction
Continue reading “Ontario – Arbitrator’s stand-alone jurisdiction decision a preliminary “ruling” open to de novo review – #820”